

J-1943

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December 20, 1943

Mr. Andrew Javor
Eastern Airlines *craft*
Linden, N.J.

Dear Mr. Javor,

I acknowledge with thanks your letter of December 8th. I have referred it to our various branches to determine if there is an opening for someone of your qualifications.

I suggest that you keep us advised from time to time, where you may be reached. You gave no other address than the aircraft plant where you are working.

I assume that you are interested in being assigned to the OAS even after your induction into the army.

Sincerely yours,

Marion O'Donnell

MO'D/ah

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mrs. Marian O'Donnell

FROM: The Secretariat

DATE: 14 December 1943

SUBJECT:

I have had typed out copies of the attached and have referred them to Colonel Connely for his action. I pointed out to Colonel Connely that the young man in question was about to be inducted into the Army.

I started to draft an answer for you but noted that Mr. Javor does not seem to have given a return address, although he might be reached at Eastern Aircraft, Linden, New Jersey. If you decide to try to answer him, I suggest that you tell him that the statement of his qualifications has been referred to our various Branches to determine whether or not there is an opening for him and suggesting that he keep us advised from time to time as to where he might be reached. We might also state to him that we assume that he is interested in being assigned to us even after his induction into the Army.

C.A. Bone

LIEUT. BANE

Prof. Siposs who is mentioned in the attached is a friend of the General's (he exercises with him every day). He called me about this young man the other day and I told him to have him send us his qualifications. Beyond this I know nothing about him, except that I am sure Dr. Siposs would not have recommended him unless he was pretty good.

Will you let me know what acknowledgement you wish me to make

M.O'D

Director's Office

(3300)

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the camera field

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Mr.

Harold G. Brown
Director of Defense Research
Washington

and the word war was
recommended to me by Francis Immerman

I possess certain qualifications which I am sure to
relieve some of our shortages, and I would at the
most add to our country. I speak, read and write in
English, Hungarian, German, French and Russian. I graduated
high school and had two years college at Liberty Hall.

I came to the U.S. 15 years ago, and was naturalized
in 1935. During the first six years in this country I
was employed by a dress concern first as a cook and
later as the capacity of assistant buyer and Merchandise
manager. In 1938 I became a pastry cook, and remained until
the war broke out. In Europe I've had training in Machine
shop work, therefore in 1941 when skilled labor in the war

3. The subject was considered to be a "good" person, who was not at the moment (2/2/68) in the U.S.

Recently I have been reclassified from R-B to 1-F1
and expect to be called for induction on Dec/16 30th to
the Howard H. J. Ferry.

In full reliance, Bro. Lusk has known our cause for over 25 years, and my loyalty to this country will stand the severest investigation.

Respectfully - Yours

Andrew Javor

James J. Jellie / 3, 13 6.
Harmon.

31 December 1943

Mr. Francis S. Harmon,
War Activities Committee,
Motion Picture Industry,
1801 Broadway,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Harmon:

In the absence of General Donovan, I should like to acknowledge your letter of 27 December 1943 and the material inclosed therewith regarding the qualifications of Lieut. (jg) Wallace H. Jaffe, USNR.

We shall give immediate and active consideration to the question of whether there is a spot in this office for a man with the qualifications of Lieut. Jaffe. We are very grateful to you for having called him to our attention since we are always interested in young men who may be of use to us.

Very truly yours,

Charles S. Houston,
Acting Assistant Director.

You let it be. 8th ...
 by me ... to ...
 to ... of ...
 opening ...
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I suggest that you
 keep us advised from time to
 time, when you hear, he is ...
 you ... no other address ...
 the aircraft plant ...
 work. -

Yassum ... an
 interested in him, as ...
 off. ... your ...
 the army.

I am, your
 friend,
 ...



31 December 1943

Mr. Francis S. Harman,
War Activities Committee,
Motion Picture Industry,
1844 Broadway,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Harman:

In the absence of General Donovan, I should like to acknowledge your letter of 27 December 1943 and the material inclosed therewith regarding the qualifications of Lieut. (jg) Wallace H. Jamie, USNR.

We shall give immediate and action consideration to the question of whether there is a spot in this office for a man with the qualifications of Lieut. Jamie. We are very grateful to you for having called him to our attention since we are always interested in young men who may be of use to us.

Very truly yours,

Charles E. Ghespen,
Acting Assistant Director.

October 11, 1953
 X Implementation

MEMORANDUM

TO: Branch Heads
 FROM: General Wm. J. Donovan
 SUBJECT: Implementation of Jedburgh Plan

1. In order to implement the Jedburgh Plan which has been given highest priority in the European Theater, the following procedure will be observed.

a. Temporarily, the following grades allotted in the European Theater shall not be filled by the branches indicated without the specific approval of one of the following officers:

Director, Assistant Director or the Chief of Secretariat

	C. of M.	SC	SI	X-2	R&A	MO	MA	TOTAL
Lt. Col		2	1	1		1		5
Major		2	1		1	1		5
Captain		14	2		2	1		19
1st Lt.				5	2	1	1	9
2nd Lt.	2		1	1	2		1	7
	2	18	5	7	7	4	2	45

b. The seven officers required of Communications for the Jedburgh Plan shall be provided from its current allotment. It is understood that Communications cannot make any further contribution without impairing its operating efficiency.

Wm. J. Donovan
 Director


(25245)

Originator General Hallinan
 Date 2 Sept 43
 Addressee General Donovan
 Date Rec'd Sept. 7, 1943

Subject Capt. O. H. Gease

X Sent Internal

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		
<u>Mr. Ladd</u>	<u>449</u>	<u>7/29</u>	<u>7/29</u>		<u>I've your info & return to</u>
<u>Secretariat</u>	<u>226</u>				
<u>Mr. J. Donnell</u>					



Date: 9/10/43

to. Ensign Putrell

Re: attached letter from Maj. General
Gullion in connection with Captain
O.H. Jesse

PLEASE LET DR. LANGER SEE THIS.

G. EDWARD BUXTON


G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

(12878)

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Dr. Lanyon would be interested in nothing



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ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON

7 September 1943.


Brigadier General William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Your letter of September 4th, relating to Captain
O. R. Jesse, is before me. I appreciate your needs and
am grateful for the broadminded cooperative spirit your
letter reveals.

Disclaiming, I hope effectively, any irreverence I
am sometimes reminded in surveying personnel of the
position in which the Lord found Himself regarding Sodom.
I am not referring to morals but to mediocrity. You will
remember that Abraham was told if ten righteous men could
be found in the city it would not be destroyed. I some-
times think that with ten really superior men I could
dispense with scores of mere men. I need not labor the
analogy further to a man of your experience --- suffice
it to say that Captain Jesse is one of the ten men to be
counted if the city is to be saved. When he helps clean
up one job I always have another crying for his ministrations.
I will, however, bear you in mind and give you
first choice upon his services when I can spare him. I
know the magnitude of your task and I am appreciative of
the assistance your staff has rendered me.

Cordially yours,


Allen W. Gullion,
Major General,
The Provost Marshal General.



September 4, 1949

Major General A. W. Gullion
Room 1068
Warrenton Building
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Gullion:

On my return from Africa I discovered that during my absence some effort had been made to have Captain O. H. Jessie assigned to this organization from your office. I am told that you considered it impossible to have him transferred from the work he is now doing with you. Naturally, this settles the matter as far as we are concerned, but I thought I ought to write you a few words in explanation of our request.

As you may recall, we had hoped to make Captain Jessie Assistant Chief of our Central Information Division. This Division has grown at a very rapid rate in recent months and will probably continue to do so. It consists at the present time of a collection of some 40,000 documents all of which are carefully cataloged and indexed and contains also a number of special libraries such as the German Library of Information, the French Library of Information, the Library of the Italian-American Chamber of Commerce, and so forth and so on. In addition the Central Information Division handles all our censor materials and has control of both our Pictorial Records Section and our Biographical Records Section. The Pictorial Records Section has the responsibility of locating and collecting pictures of strategic use for the Armed Services from all non-governmental sources. The Biographical Records Section is building up a great central file of information on foreign personalities. This file is of particular value in the rapidly expanding work of Civil Affairs.

I mention these things merely to indicate the magnitude of the job we have in our hands in dealing with all this material. Captain Jessie's previous experience

September 4, 1943

with the Aetna Life Insurance Company would certainly enable him to make a great contribution here, and I should like to have you know that we would have been very happy indeed to have him with us. It occurs to me that possibly when the work in your office is set up and operating, you might find it possible to release Captain Jossie; in which case I hope you will give our needs further consideration.

Very sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

W Langerman

Casablanca, July 27, 1944.

Dear General Donovan,

Your visit to the Casablanca OSS team was greatly appreciated by its small staff- and it was very very good for the morale.

Even if it was very short, I feel we accomplished a great deal in a short time. Thanks for giving this small OSS unit your attention and thought.

As a working outfit, we want work to do. I hope it won't be long before you assign Michel Desnoix, and, I add, myself, to tasks more important for the job to be done.

We hope you found your voyage pleasant, and valuable.

Very sincerely,

Lloyd V. Jacquet.

Lloyd V. Jacquet,
OSS Representative
In charge, Casablanca.

13/4

WASHINGTON, D C

June 15, 1943

TO: General Donovan
FROM: William L. Langer
SUBJECT: Council on Foreign Relations Meeting

I recently sent you a memorandum summarizing remarks made by Dr. Chaim Weizmann at a small dinner given by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. I passed these remarks on also to Dr. Ephraim Speiser, the Chief of our Near-East Section. He has in turn made some comments on Weizmann's remarks, and these, I think, you will want to see as they seem useful commentary.

Attached also is a memorandum by Speiser on the "Jewish Army" issue. Since this thing has been battered around for a long time, I think that the survey summary may be of some use.

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Attachments

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Dr. William L. Langer
 FROM: E. A. Spisner *EAS*
 SUBJECT: Council on Foreign Relations Meeting



Mr. Langer's account of the dinner meeting at the Council on Foreign Relations on Monday evening, May 31, deals with matters of unusual interest. Dr. Ch. Weismann, for whom the dinner was given, appears ready at last to think of Palestine in terms of a country "organized as a Jewish-Arab state along Swiss lines." This is a significant concession for the head of the World Zionist Organization, hitherto committed to an uncompromising stand on the question of the Jewish homeland. A comparable realism may be detected in the attitude of certain Arab leaders, for all their avowed insistence on exclusively Arab sovereignty. There are thus moderates on both sides who seem resigned, as yet privately and unofficially, to see the all but hopeless impasse resolved at long last. With a federated Palestine no longer the plaything of visionaries, our Government should be in a position to undertake a declaration of a constructive and consistent Arab policy, wholly in harmony with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. Both Zionist and pan-Arab extremists would thereby be placed on the defensive. The world would be freed from a major source of grievance and the Axis deprived of one of its keenest propaganda weapons.

To be sure, Weismann is by no means the spokesman for all the Zionists. He will be seconded by hard-headed realists like Moshe Shertok, chief of the political department of the Jewish Agency; but violent opposition should be expected from the faction headed by Ben Gurion and the extremist Revisionist wing. Nevertheless, Weismann's position is bound to command a substantial following, if and when it is made public. Jewish public opinion these days is compounded largely of emotion and half-truths, as is evident from the commotion stirred by the Jewish Army issue. A frank public statement by Weismann in the spirit of his off-the-record remarks would go a long way toward reconciling the Jewish rank and file with the realities of the day. Such a step would also have a refreshing effect on responsible Arab leaders.

Turning now to some of the details recorded by Mr. Langer, Weismann's supplementary remarks appear, perhaps understandably enough, not quite free from bias. The following points are worth closer attention:

(1) It is true that the Arabs owe what they got out of the last war to Anglo-American approval. But they did not receive, by any means, all that they believed to have been promised, any more than the Jews did. Subsequent concessions to the Arabs came as the result of rebellions in the East and relative indifference in the West. Shotgun remedies are a poor substitute for honest efforts at neutralizing potential sources of further friction.

(2) The correspondence between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud cannot in itself effect a cure of the Palestine ills. Neither Ibn Saud nor Nahhas Pasha, nor yet Nuri es-Said, can claim to speak for all the Arabs, least of all the Arabs of Palestine. The region teems with parochial rivalries and jealousies. The principals concerned are the Arabs and Jews of Palestine and any solution that is to be enduring and not merely ephemeral must have the consent of the actual contestants.

(3) Turkish mediation would introduce yet another irritant. The Turks have good reason to oppose any and all moves tending to ease inner-Arab stresses and promote pan-Arab unity. A shotgun solution dictated from Ankara promises no more success than one imposed by London or Washington.

To sum up, the realistic leanings which have begun to show through the armour of responsible leaders among Jews and Arabs alike should be brought into the open and highlighted for the sobering and educational effect that they are bound to have on the two groups involved. The prize at stake is a defensible Palestine policy, without which there is no hope of checking Arab unrest and winning over the vast Islamic front.

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MEMO ON THE "JEWISH ARMY" ISSUE

The agitation for a "Jewish Army of Palestinian and Stateless Jews" presents a problem of great complexity because of the variety of political, military, and emotional aspects involved. Having become articulate in 1941, this movement attained its maximum appeal in the summer of 1942, when Rommel stood at the gates of Alexandria. But even though the argument of military urgency has now been pushed into the remote background, the movement has not subsided. Its supporters and opponents are numbered in the thousands and tens of thousands, while the implications and consequences of the issues raised by it have by now come to involve millions of people. Claims and counterclaims have snowballed to a corresponding degree. Since both camps rest their premises upon United Nations policy, a sober and dispassionate review of the situation is very much in order.

Background and Sponsors

The idea of a Jewish Army is not just an incidental byproduct of the present war. A concrete model was provided by the Jewish Legion of the War of 1914-18, whose commander Vladimir Jabotinsky went on to found the activist, or "Revisionist" (extreme right) wing of the Zionist Party. The armed unit of the various Governments in exile have served as a more immediate prototype.

Even though the Revisionists have on most issues been strongly opposed by the majority of the Zionist Party, the latter adopted without reservations the principle of a Jewish Army. Gradually, the plan gained favor with many non-Zionist Jews, including a majority of the Reform Rabbinate (as voted by the Central Conference of American Rabbis on February 27, 1943), for all the doctrinal opposition to Zionist aims on the part of Reform Judaism. But the broadest appeal has been registered among non-Jews. The "Committee for a Jewish Army" (organized on December 4, 1941) is thus headed by Pierre van Paasland (now replaced by Senator Johnson of Colorado), with Dr. Samuel Haysden Church and Col. John Henry Patterson as Honorary Chairmen. Hundreds of prominent men from all walks of life, including Senators, Representatives, and Governors, have been cited in the published appeals on the subject (e.g., NY Times, May 1, 1942, p. 18; Dec. 7, 1942, p. 18).

Reasons Behind the Movement

There are several disparate reasons for this widespread interest in the establishment of a Jewish Army. The Revisionist philosophy has always called for a show of strength. The rank and file of the Zionists need not have looked in 1942 for a better argument than that of added military preparedness; nevertheless, the political advantage of such armed cooperation with the Allied Nations is not likely to have been ignored altogether. Most Jews, however, Zionist and non-Zionist alike, have been affected primarily by the melancholy fate of the Jews in Europe. The opportunity of fighting it out with a sadistic foe has bolstered the spirits of many whom events in Europe had filled with helpless despair. And it is this refusal to "take it lying down," and the human element back of "the fight for the right to fight" that have gained so many recruits for the cause among an impressive list of non-Jews. Others have restricted themselves to the argument of expediency. An army of "300,000 eager Jews in Palestine" -- one U. S. Senator was quoted as saying -- would permit the diversion of more men to the Pacific area; ease the pressure on the youths of 18 and 19; help the man-power problem; ease the demands on shipping by obviating the necessity of moving that number abroad; and gain that many practical opponents of the Nazis (NY Journal-American, Nov. 30, 1942).

Opposition to the Movement

The resistance to the plan for a separate Jewish Army is no less diversified. Among the Jews, formal opposition has been expressed by a minority of the Reform Rabbis because of their "universalistic conception of Jewish history" (NY Times, June 2, 1942; August 30, 1942). The federation party (Yehud) headed by Dr. J. L. Magnes, Chancellor of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, could not be expected to back so controversial a program (cf. "Toward Peace in Palestine," Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1943, pp. 236-46). Among individual Jews who have voiced their opposition, Prof. Morris R. Cohen's objections may be viewed as representative; his statement deplors the "near-sighted nationalistic philosophy" of the program and concludes that "only by negotiation with the Arabs" can a solution be achieved and that "real help can come only from winning the war against the racialistic ideology" (NY Times, January 26, 1942, p. 14).

The British Government was at first reported as favoring the plan in principle. According to a dispatch by R. Mallard Stead to the Christian Science Monitor (March 17, 1942), the Government

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"approved officially but deferred [The matter] indefinitely through a shortage of shipping space, equipment, and other difficulties." This convenient indecision was given formal expression in the announcement by Sir James Grigg, British Secretary of State for War, made on August 6, 1942, that there was to be established a Palestinian force of separate Jewish and Arab battalions (NY Times, Aug. 7, 1942).

The most significant opposition, however, is that of the Arabs of the Near East in general and Palestine in particular. It is a fact that the Jewish problem in Palestine has united the Arabs as they had not been united since the early days of Islam. Non-Arab Muslims, too, and the highly influential Christian Arabs, are at one on this issue. Not a little of the pro-Axis feeling among the Muslims is traceable directly to Britain's alleged pro-Jewish leanings. The Jewish question has been the one sure-fire type of ammunition beamed to the Near East by Axis radio propaganda. The agitation for a Jewish Army has merely served to aggravate Arab fears and the stock of the United States has been depreciating steadily in the Near East in proportion to the growth of the movement in this country.

Re-examination of the Issue

In reviewing the various arguments for and against a Jewish Army, the striking fact emerges that the plan for such an Army and the Zionist question are regarded as inseparable. This is by no means the case. Many of the supporters of a Jewish Army are non-Zionists or non-Jews, some of whom are indifferent, if not hostile, to Zionist political plans. Moreover, Zionism maintained itself for many years without insisting on a separate army in the immediate future. If the issue of a Jewish Army is to be seen objectively and dispassionately, it should be weighed on its own merits without being injected into the far more involved controversy that centers about Zionism. For otherwise, Zionist claims would prove only as valid as the claims in favor of a separate army. And these happen to be far less compelling than is generally realized.

The officially sponsored figure as given out by the Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews is 200,000 (NY Times, May 1, 1942, p. 13; Dec. 7, 1942, p. 14). It is asserted that this number could be raised in the Middle East. When the Eighth Army was desperately pressed in Egypt it seemed inexcusable to many that so valuable a reservoir of eager combatants

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should not be utilized. Unfortunately, the figure of 200,000 can be arrived at only by a very dangerous form of wishful thinking. The total Jewish population of Palestine is about 600,000. The number of Jewish soldiers that might be raised there by conscription could hardly be more than 50,000. [According to Dr. Chaim Weizman, President of the World Zionist Organisation, 25,000 young Jews would be available for army service (MIS Report No. 3907, May 6, 1942 - CID 16729). Moshe Sherbok, Secretary of the Jewish Agency puts the figure at 28,000.] Now 14,000 have already enlisted voluntarily. There are surely not enough stateless Jews in the rest of the Middle East to yield 10,000 additional soldiers. In other words, the absolute total of available Jewish soldiers in the Middle East not yet under arms is well under 50,000. With the Axis armies now out of Africa, a possible maximum accession to the Allies of not more than 50,000 could not be expected to make much difference at best.

The grossly overstated figure is obviously due to more enthusiasm than sound judgment. It is evidently based on the number of Palestinian Jews enrolled for civilian defense, which is stated to be 135,000. But this number includes men and women, over and under military age, physically fit and unfit. And yet, much of the appeal contained in the agitation for a Jewish Army is based on this enormously mistaken calculation.

A Psychological Windfall -- for the Enemy

As against the comparatively slender advantage of gaining some two additional divisions by authorizing a separate army under a Jewish flag, there is the wholly disproportionate disadvantage of cementing the antagonism of 40 million Arab-speaking people and countless additional millions of other Muslims; also, of feeding the Axis with the most effective argument that could be turned against the Allies in the Near East. It is very doubtful whether the large numbers of non-Zionists and non-Jews who have come out so generously and wholeheartedly for a Jewish Army would continue their support if the plain facts were pointed out. Nor is it sure that the Zionists would wish to maintain their present stand on the subject if they could see the balance sheet more clearly. They would scarcely want to embarrass the Allies, contribute to the lessening of the prestige of the United States in the Near East, use up an enormous amount of good will under pretenses that are wholly false -- however innocently -- jeopardize their chances of a sympathetic hearing when the time comes to take up the question again, and shut the door to any possibility of future rapprochement with the Arabs -- all this for the right to try to muster enough manpower for two divisions! It would not be good idealism; neither would it be good realism.

WASHINGTON, D C

June 2, 1943

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan
FROM: William L. Langer
SUBJECT: Council on Foreign Relations Meeting

Last Monday evening, May 31, I attended a small dinner at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York given for Dr. Chaim Weizmann.

Dr. Weizmann spoke at some length on the situation in Palestine and the whole Zionist problem, and expressed himself vigorously on the need for an agreement between the Jews and the Arabs. I thought the following points might interest you.

Dr. Weizmann thought that the President and Churchill should tell the Arabs flat-footedly that what they have gotten out of the last war was what they have gotten through the British and the United States, and that what they could hope to get out of the present war would again be what the United Nations were willing to concede to them. Under the circumstances he thought that the President and Churchill might tell the Arabs that they would have to give up "one little corner" for the Jewish refuge. Weizmann didn't seem to care particularly whether this "little corner" were organized as a Jewish-Arab state along Swiss lines or whether it were a Jewish state with constitutional guarantees for an Arab population.

I asked him then to what Arabs Churchill and the President should address themselves. His reply, I thought, was rather illuminating. He indicated that there had already been some correspondence between the President and King Ibn Saud and that the King was quite prepared to make concessions with regard to Palestine. He appears to have asked whether he should deal with the matter openly or not, and the reply given to him was that he had better not act publicly at this time. In any case Weizmann seems to think that agreement with Ibn Saud was decidedly within the range of possibility.

General Donovan


- 2 -

June 2, 1943

The second person he mentioned was Nahas Pasha of Egypt whom he described as one of the few Moslems whom he regards as a real democrat. Weizmann talked at some length to Nahas Pasha and felt that he could be counted upon to use his influence in the right direction.

Weizmann then turned to Turkey and said that the Turks would be the ideal mediators in this whole matter because they still enjoy tremendous prestige among all Moslems. Weizmann's strongly expressed view was that if Turkey could be brought into the war, a settlement of the Palestine problem with the Turkish Government as mediator would furnish the easiest solution.

Incidentally, Weizmann appeared irritated at the lack of positive action on the part of the British and Americans, but he was nevertheless in a hopeful frame of mind. He admitted that one of his chief ideas had always been to get a population of 500,000 Jews into Palestine, because once there were that many Jews, it would be utterly impossible for either the British or the American government to go back on the idea of a homeland for the Jews. Since there are now 550,000 Jews in Palestine, he is convinced that what has been done cannot be undone.


William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

April 20, 1948

SECRET

SUBJECT: Request for Transportation

TO: The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, Room 3 E 202, Pentagon Building, Arlington, Virginia

FROM: Brigadier General John E. Stone

1. a) It is requested that transportation to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, be provided by first available air passage after May 15th, for the 485 personnel listed below:

Edward J. Jones, Sp5(P), USAR
Date: 1948-04-20

b) It is further requested that such transportation be provided with Group 8000, Section XII, referred to in my letter of April 21, 1948, requesting transportation for this group under the authorization mentioned therein.

2. Since the above representative is a member of the U. S. Navy, we have requested his travel status through the Chief of Naval Personnel.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

X Recommendation

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: February 26, 1943

FROM: Director, S. I.

SUBJECT: A letter of recommendation for Captain Sherman B. Joost, Jr.

Captain Sherman B. Joost, Jr. has just been assigned to OSS and it is understood that he will be available within the next few days. Since it is important to get him into school as soon as possible, Mr. Van Buren of the Security Department has advised that if three letters endorsing Captain Joost from members of this organization are forthcoming, it would act as a temporary security check until the regular security check comes through and he could go to school right away.

Mr. Van Buren happens to know Captain Joost himself and will write one letter, Mr. A. D. Hutcheson knows Captain Joost and will write another letter, and it has been suggested that you might know Captain Joost, who married Gwynne Harrison, a neighbor of yours in Boyce, Virginia.

If you know Captain Joost sufficiently to sign the attached letter regarding him, or something similar, it would be very much appreciated. Since Captain Joost is coming to us from G-2, it would appear that his security must already have been pretty well checked.

Wm. H. Bradford

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 26, 1945

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to state that I know
Captain Sherman B. Joost, Jr., and that in
my opinion his integrity and loyalty to the
United States, and his character are suitable
for a member of this organization.

William J. Donovan
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

London

AG SAC
(3-13-63)PC-The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D. C.Date/Time/Sec
Pl. 7/15-7/11

March 1, 1963

Subject: Orders

Thru : Director, Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

To : Captain Lawrence Jacob, LI, 0904372, AC.

1. The Secretary of War relieves Captain Lawrence Jacob, LI, 0904372, AC, from assignment and duty in the Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C., and assigns him to permanent station outside the continental limits of the United States, temperate climate, Shipment CGA-703. When notified by the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, that transportation is available, he will proceed from his present station to Brooklyn, N. Y., and report on the date specified to the Commanding General, that Port, for transportation to destination, via United States Army transport or commercial steamship. Upon arrival at destination, he will report to the Director, Strategic Services for duty. TDR FD 31 P 431-01,02, 03, 07, Ch A 0425-23.

2. If the travel to the port of embarkation is performed by privately owned automobile, par. 1, e, AR 650-180 applies. Relatives and friends will neither accompany officer to the port of embarkation nor join him there prior to sailing.

3. Prior to departure from present station, he will be equipped for extended field service, including steel helmet and gas mask, and will have in his possession DFD Form 81, showing inoculations and immunizations required before leaving the continental limits of the United States, and will require physical inspection as prescribed by par. 14, AR 40-100 as amended by Sec. III, Cir. 31, 13, 1962. Articles of equipment not available at present station may be obtained at the port of embarkation.

4. Reimbursement for the expense incurred in connection with the travel will be made to the War Department by the Office of Strategic Services. The Adjutant General's Office, payment in connection with the travel performed will attach a copy of the voucher, showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number, and citation of this order, by letter of transmittal to The Adjutant General's Office, attention Fiscal Section, stating that the enclosed copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

CONFIDENTIAL

AG 140
(3-15-43)PO-1

NAVY DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D. C.

11D/aa/Ins/1515 Mu.
Br. 79065-76321

E X T R A C T

March 18, 1943.

Letter Orders for: Captain Lawrence Jacob, II, 9094372, AG.

1. The following is an extract of Classified Letter Orders issued this date to the above-named officer.
2. Relieved from assignment and duty at Washington, D. C., and assigned to permanent station outside the continental limits of the United States. When notified by the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, that transportation is available, he will proceed from his present station to Brooklyn, N. Y., and report on the date specified to the Commanding General, that Port, for transportation to destination, via United States Army transport or commercial steamship. Upon arrival at destination, he will report to the Director, for duty. TDN PD 31 P 431-01, 02, 03, 07, 08 A 0425-13.
3. If the travel to the port of embarkation is performed by privately owned automobile, par. 1, e. AR 605-180 applies. Relatives and friends will neither accompany officer to the port of embarkation nor join him there prior to sailing.
4. Prior to departure from present station, he will be equipped for extended field service, including steel helmet and gas mask, and will have in his possession ND ND Form 21, showing inoculations and immunizations required before leaving the continental limits of the United States, and will require physical inspection as prescribed by par. 1A, AR 40-100, as amended by Sec. III, Cir. 31, D, 1942. Articles of equipment not available at present station may be obtained at the port of embarkation.
5. Officer should advise his correspondents that mail will be addressed to him at APO 3076, c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y. Upon arrival at destination, permanent APO number will be used. Personal baggage will be marked with the officer's name, c/o Port Transportation Officer, New York Port of Embarkation, Brooklyn, N. Y.

By order of the Secretary of War:



A. R. Lang
Adjutant General

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE March 12, 1947

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
FROM: Kenneth Mygatt
SUBJECT

Will you please sign the attached request for Army Orders for Captain Lawrence Jacob and return it to me?

The request for travel has been in Colonel Maddocks' hands for some time and this request for Army Orders has been delayed by a security check. We are now very anxious to expedite this matter.

K.M.

Encl.

/ack
March 11, 1943

SUBJECT: Orders

THRU: Chief, Combined Subjects Section, CPD, Room 3E780, Pentagon Building.

TO: The Adjutant General, Room 1515, Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

1. Request necessary orders directing the following named officer to proceed from Washington, D. C. to London, England, when directed by the Director of Strategic Services, reporting on arrival to Major George Brewer, for duty:

Captain Lawrence Jacob, II, 0904372, AC

2. Travel by military or commercial aircraft, belligerent vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, army or naval transport, and rail should be authorized. Travel by air from Washington, D. C., to destination is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission. Transportation is being arranged by this office; therefore it is requested that officer proceed to the Port of Embarkation or take such route as the Director, Office of Strategic Services may direct.

3. A flat per diem of \$6.00 should be authorized while travelling by air.

4. A baggage allowance of fifty-five (55) pounds while travelling by aircraft should be authorized. It is further requested that additional baggage be authorized to be shipped by vessel or transport to destination.

5. Prior to departure from his present station, he should be equipped for extended field service, tropical climate, including steel helmet, gas mask, 1 pistol, .45 cal. M&P; 1 holster, leather, .45 cal., 1 pockets, magazine, web, double; 1 belt, pistol; 1 packet, first aid; 1 pouch, first aid packet; 2 magazines, assem (clip) .45 cal; 21 rounds cartridge, ammunition, .45 cal.

6. Officer will have in his possession VD MD Form 61, showing inoculations and immunizations required before leaving the continental limits of the United States, and will require physical inspection as prescribed in Army Regulations.

7. Officer should be authorized to wear civilian clothing in the performance of this mission.

8. Request that an MPD be designated for this officer while on duty in London.

9. Reimbursement for the expenses incurred in connection with the travel will be made to the War Department by the Office of Strategic Services.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

x London

February 20th 1943

Colonel Ray T. Maddocks,
Room 3 E 788,
Pentagon Building,
Arlington, Va.

Dear Colonel Maddocks:

It is requested that approval be granted for the sending of Lt. Lawrence Jacob by air to London to complete the complement in our London office on Special Operations work.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

✓

Colonel Donovan

Mr. Lendice of the State Dept.
called with this message from
Ambassador Winant.

It is OK for Manning Jacob.

2/25/43

101

Alvin London
7-743

Alvin London

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VACON, Manning 2.6.43
Winant, Amb John G

SECRET

February 19, 1943

Ambassador John G. Winant,
 Washington Hotel,
 Washington, D.C.

Dear John:

We have just received word from our London office about Captain Manning Jacoby who, I understand, is serving as your Aide.

We understand that he lead a platoon in a successful and gallant action against a French fort in Africa, and that as a result of overtraining he developed varicose veins and is now back at the Embassy in London on duty.

Our office there has asked if you could loan him to us for a period of eight weeks. Our particular reason for asking for him is that we have in hand operations where he could be absolutely invaluable in assisting in the training of personnel and with their briefing.

Captain Jacoby would like to help us in this respect because he thinks his experience could be effectively employed, but says his first loyalty is to you.

He wants us to tell you that he will be in London to meet you and might be prevented from doing so only if this special work would be in a critical phase at that time.

All our people there know him personally and have the highest regards for him.

Remember you were to let me know about dinner, and when we should eat.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

SECRET

Cable
Contract:
#1873
Entered to
1676
London
2/2/43

February 20, 1943

Colonel Ray T. Maddocks,
Room 3 E 788,
Pentagon Building,
Arlington, Va.

Dear Colonel Maddocks:

It is requested that approval be granted for the sending of Pvt. Owen D. Johnson to London to complete the complement in our London office on Special Operations work.

We are not asking for air transportation for this man. He can be sent by surface vessel.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

10 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRED B. JENSEN

SUBJECT: Commendation

1. Prior to your recent departure from this country General Donovan instructed me to convey to you the following message:

"Your service during the past 15 months as Vice Consul at Goteborg, Sweden, has constituted a splendid record of achievement under most difficult and trying conditions. Without regard to personal dangers you have accomplished very successfully the special mission entrusted to you. It is a source of pride to me personally to know that the results of your efforts as a representative of this Agency have served as the basis of certain strategic decisions made by our Government in the field of foreign policy. I commend you on the superior work you have done."

2. In what General Donovan has said I heartily concur and extend to you my personal congratulations for a job well done.

G. Howard Burton
Acting Director

135 14
SECRET

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 22, 1944

SECRET

TO: William J. Donovan, Brig. Gen.
 FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson
 SUBJECT: IN-15085

(144) *London*
20 - Stockholm

At your request, we are providing herewith the background on the withdrawal from Sweden of Mr. Finn B. Jensen, subject of the above-mentioned cable:

Mr. Jensen has been in Sweden for the past 15 months as Vice Consul at Goteborg. During that period, he has done a superior job, including obtaining detailed information on the shipment of SKF ball bearings to Germany. Information provided by him on this latter subject was largely responsible for the action which the Department of State took vis-a-vis the Swedish Government on supplying ball bearings to Germany. In the early part of May three of the people who were providing information on SKF to Mr. Jensen were arrested by the Swedish police with incriminating evidence in their possession. These people received prison terms of three to four years at hard labor. They were Swedish citizens. This arrest "blew" Mr. Jensen, and since that time he has been closely shadowed by the Swedish counter-espionage authorities. Chief of OSS, Sweden, informed us recently that he felt Mr. Jensen's usefulness in Sweden was at an end and that he should be assigned to London where he could make a valuable contribution on Norwegian operations. It has been decided to bring Mr. Jensen back to the United States immediately, so that he can take care of certain personal affairs including a suit for divorce brought by Mrs. Jensen. Upon his return here, the final decision will be made as to whether he will return to London to perform the duties outlined.

TO Mr. Bonyon

*Mr. Jensen is done
 in the way of Commenda*

State Dept.

February 15, 1943

The Honorable O. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

In amplification of my letter of February 9, 1943 to you regarding the appointment of Finn Bjorn Jensen as Vice-Consul at Goteborg, Sweden, I would appreciate it if Mr. Jensen could be paid through State Department an annual salary of \$3,500 and annual living and quarters allowance of \$2,160. These amounts, I understand, are in accord with present State Department practice regarding compensation of Vice-Consuls.

In addition, I would appreciate the payment by State Department of Mr. Jensen's transportation expenses to his post, and the assistance of the Department in obtaining priority for his travel.

Full reimbursement for all salary, living and transportation expenses will be made out of the O.S.S. working fund established with State Department.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,
Director.

JWD/ccc

CC: Mr. Klahal
Lt. Col. Bohn
Mr. Barnes

State Dept.

February 9, 1943.

The Honorable C. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

✓ We would appreciate it if Finn Bjorn Jensen might be appointed Vice-Consul at Goteborg, Sweden.

Mr. Jensen's salary and other financial needs will be assumed directly by the Office of Strategic Services in Washington. The Department of State there-fore will not find it necessary to assume any of his financial obligations other than those incidental to communications addressed through State Department facilities. These expenses can be met through the working fund which has been set up with the Department of State.

Mr. Jensen will communicate with this office in O.S.S. Code. It will be appreciated if use of the Department's communications facilities at Goteborg may be accorded him.

Mr. Jensen plans to leave this country in the very near future, and we shall appreciate it if you will so advise the Consul at Goteborg.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,
Director

JWD/enc

March 30, 1943

From: The Director of Strategic Services
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel
Subject: Elmer G. Johnson

1. Mr. Elmer G. Johnson is applying for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He is employed in the Office of Strategic Services.
2. He is hereby released for service with the armed forces.
3. If qualified for appointment and is appointed, it is requested that he be certified and ordered to the Office of Strategic Services for assignment.
4. Mr. Johnson is recommended as being qualified under Special Program No. 23-42.
5. The nature of Mr. Johnson's duties will be such as to warrant a waiver of any non-organic physical defect and it is requested that such waiver, if required, be granted.
6. Mr. Johnson's address is:

Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

William J. Donovan
Director

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